Reconceptualizing hate crime victimization through the lens of vulnerability and 'difference' by Chakraborti, N & Garland, J
1 
 
 1 
Reconceptualising hate crime victimisation through the lens of vulnerability 
and ‘difference’ 
Neil Chakraborti and Jon Garland 
 
Abstract 
This article suggests that the concepts of vulnerability and ‘difference’ should be the focal 
points of hate crime scholarship if the values at the heart of the hate crime movement are 
not to be diluted. By stringently associating hate crime with particular strands of victims and 
sets of motivations through singular constructions of identity, criminologists have created a 
divisive and hierarchical approach to understanding hate crime. To counter these 
limitations, we propose that vulnerability and ‘difference’, rather than identity and group 
membership alone, should be central to investigations of hate crime. These concepts would 
allow for a more inclusive conceptual framework enabling hitherto overlooked and 
vulnerable victims of targeted violence to receive the recognition they urgently need. 
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Introduction 
The concept of a ‘hate crime’ is now a familiar one to criminologists and to scholars in the 
related disciplines of sociology, psychology, public policy, political science and legal studies. 
For many, it is a politically and socially significant crime that captures the intersections 
between various forms of bigotry; an umbrella concept with the capacity to unite disparate 
social movements and to direct attention towards the collective experiences of minority 
groups and the commonalities in their victimisation. For others, hate crime is a slippery and 
somewhat elusive term whose conceptual and operational ambiguity raises thorny 
questions for those charged with responding to the forms of victimisation and perpetration 
associated with the construct.  
 
Whatever one’s viewpoint – and many criminologists would agree that neither stance is 
mutually exclusive – the underlying principles of the hate crime movement are laudable. A 
growing awareness of the harms associated with acts of bigotry and prejudice has been 
evident in most Western democracies over recent decades. The apparent rise in the number 
of such incidents (at least in terms of recorded figures), together with greater public 
acceptance of ‘difference’ and the legacy of progressive social movements, has stimulated 
considerable interest within scholarly and law enforcement domains. The ensuing raft of 
empirical, legislative and other associated policy interventions reveals the regional, national 
and international prioritisation of hate crime discourse and its importance to the 
governance of diversity and community cohesion. 
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At the same time however, our understanding of hate crime is far from complete, or as 
Phyllis Gerstenfeld (2004: xv) observed some years ago, ‘hate crimes seem to be a topic of 
some interest to nearly everybody, and yet few people really know much about them’. This 
remains a valid point despite the time that has passed since that assertion. Certainly, on the 
basis of what we learn through academic, policy and public discourse it would seem that 
hate crime can mean very different things to different people. Some, particularly lay-people, 
will understandably adopt a more literal interpretation of hate crimes in line with the more 
violent and extreme cases that make the news. Scholars, meanwhile, tend to see them as a 
social construct with no straightforward meaning and offer a set of defining characteristics 
which they regard as central to their commission.1 Practitioners are likely to pursue a much 
less complex view which requires few of the machinations evident within academic 
interpretations. 
 
Amidst this conceptual confusion a keenly-argued debate has taken place regarding which 
groups are able to think of themselves as ‘hate crime victim groups’, and thus be entitled to 
protection by relevant ‘bias crime’ legislation. This debate, and the accompanying 
legislation, has tended to centre around relatively narrow conceptualisations of identity and 
community, commonly regarded as immutable or fundamental as protected 
characteristics2. Reflecting the roots of the concept of hate crime in the civil rights struggles 
in 1960s and 1970s America, a common pre-requisite for scholars and criminal justice 
practitioners regarding hate crime victims is that they must come from traditionally 
marginalised minority groups. In other words, members of majority communities cannot be 
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understood to be victims of hate crimes as this is the preserve of historically disadvantaged 
minorities, even if the nature of their targeted victimisation is very similar. 
 
The limitations of this approach to hate crimes were thrown into sharp relief by the killing of 
goth Sophie Lancaster in 2007 in a public park in Lancashire, northern England. Sophie had 
been the victim of a brutal assault from five strangers who targeted her because of her 
visually striking appearance – her ‘difference’ (Garland, 2010). Even though the Judge at the 
Court of Appeal labelled the case a ‘hate crime’ no specific hate crime legislation existed 
under which her attackers could be prosecuted, because Sophie was not from one of those 
officially recognised hate crime victim groups that are included under such laws.  
 
Since this case pressure has grown, not least from the Sophie Lancaster Foundation itself, to 
include other groups in the remit of hate crime legislation3. However – and as this article 
goes on to argue – approaching the issue of inclusion through the lens of group identity 
politics merely exacerbates existing problems, creating divisions among communities of 
identity rather than highlighting the shared nature of their victimisation. Instead, we call for 
a re-evaluation of the way in which hate crime has come to be stringently associated with 
particular forms of victimisation based upon one-dimensional, though well-intentioned 
interpretations of identity. Specifically, we propose that perceived vulnerability and 
‘difference’ should feature more prominently in the ways in which scholars and policy-
makers across the world think about hate crime in order to counter the limitations of 
prevailing frameworks.  
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This article begins by examining the overarching themes of such frameworks, and considers 
them within the context of particular lived realities of hate crime victimisation that have 
been marginal to the construction of theory and policy. It then argues the case for a fresh 
vulnerability-based framework designed to prevent scholars, law enforcers and practitioners 
from becoming side-tracked by factors peripheral to targeted victimisation. Such a focus, we 
assert, would extend recognition to the more ‘hidden’ victims of hate crime and would 
enable them to receive access to a more extensive range of support services. 
 
Conventional conceptual frameworks 
As with crime in general, hate crime is a social construct. It emerges from a complex 
network of events, structures and underlying processes, and, as such, will be constructed 
according to different actors’ perceptions, whether they are scholars, law enforcers or 
victims (Hall, 2012). That hate crime can have multiple meanings is evident from the variety 
of interpretations offered within the existing literature. For some, hate crimes are those 
which inflict greater harm upon their victims than other crimes (Iganski, 2001). For others, 
they are illegal acts motivated, at least in part, by the group affiliation of the victim 
(Gerstenfeld, 2004). Alternatively, and reflecting the UK’s post-Macpherson victim-oriented 
agenda,4 hate crimes can refer simply to any incident perceived by the victim to be 
motivated by hate or prejudice (ACPO, 2005). 
 
In the absence of a universal definition it is Barbara Perry’s (2001) work in this area that has 
garnered the most support. Perry’s contribution is by no means the only one to have 
influenced the development of hate crime scholarship (see for example, Lawrence, 1999; 
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Jacobs, 2002), nor does it offer a hegemonic conceptualisation that has anchored academic 
interpretations or law enforcement responses. That said, her conceptual framework has left 
an indelible imprint upon contemporary hate crime discourse not just in her ‘home territory’ 
of North America but elsewhere as well (see, inter alia, Hall, 2005; Iganski, 2008; 
Chakraborti, 2010; Garland, 2012). As such, it is worth examining her stance in some detail 
as its implications – and limitations – are central to the arguments that follow in this article.  
 
According to Perry (2001: 10): 
 
Hate crime … involves acts of violence and intimidation, usually directed 
towards already stigmatised and marginalised groups. As such, it is a 
mechanism of power and oppression, intended to reaffirm the precarious 
hierarchies that characterise a given social order. It attempts to re-create 
simultaneously the threatened (real or imagined) hegemony of the 
perpetrator’s group and the ‘appropriate’ subordinate identity of the victim’s 
group. It is a means of marking both the Self and the Other in such a way as to 
re-establish their ‘proper’ relative positions, as given and reproduced by 
broader ideologies and patterns of social and political inequality. 
 
For Perry, violent and intimidating behaviour is distinctive when it involves an act of bigotry 
directed towards marginalised communities. As such hate crime cannot be divorced from 
the power dynamics present within modern societies that reinforce the ‘othering’ of those 
who are different. Indeed, the process of ‘doing difference’ is a central tenet of Perry’s 
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framework which sees hate as rooted in the ideological structures of societal oppression 
that govern normative conceptions of identity. Within such a process, hate crime emerges 
as a response to the threats posed by ‘others’ when they attempt to step out of their 
‘proper’ subordinate position within the structural order. It is, in other words, a mechanism 
through which violence is used to sustain both the hegemonic identity of the perpetrator 
and to reinforce the boundaries between dominant and subordinate groups, reminding the 
victim of their place (Perry, 2009). Hate crimes in this view are acts of violence and 
intimidation directed towards the collective wider community whom the victim is perceived 
to represent. As such, hate crimes symbolise the ‘natural’ relations of superiority and 
inferiority within the confines of structural norms, and are designed to transmit a message 
to the victim’s community that they are ‘different’ and that they ‘don’t belong’. Within this 
framework, the victims themselves are interchangeable and almost invariably strangers with 
whom the perpetrator has had little or no contact as they are chosen on the basis of their 
generic subordinate identity rather than any individual characteristics (Perry, 2001: 29).  
 
Perry’s conceptualisation of hate crime within the broader psychological and socio-political 
contexts that condition hostile reactions to the ‘other’ has been of considerable value. 
Crucially, her framework recognises that hate crimes are part of a process of repeated or 
systematic victimisation shaped by context, structure and agency (see also Kelly, 1987; 
Bowling, 1993). However, despite the strengths of Perry’s definition and its influence upon 
contemporary hate studies, its implications for the way in which we conceive of hate crime 
victimisation and perpetration are not exclusively constructive. Whilst there is merit to each 
of the composite propositions of Perry’s framework, there is danger in simply interpreting 
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them as automatic pre-requisites to be ‘chalked off’ when seeking to identify a hate crime. 
Hate crimes are more expansive than even this framework allows, and scholars should not 
be discouraged from stepping outside of its confines when seeking to shape criminological 
and criminal justice responses to them.  
In presenting this argument, we do not wish to contest the legitimacy of Perry’s framework 
of ‘doing difference’ nor to downplay its relevance for understanding hate crime as a 
product of underlying social and cultural tensions. Rather, our concern lies with the way in 
which her explanation has been used by scholars, policy-makers and practitioners to shape 
the parameters of what is categorised as hate crime without giving due regard to whether 
such an explanation satisfactorily accounts for the experiences and motivations that are 
connected to various manifestations of hate. Her framework assumes that hate offences are 
mechanisms of oppression designed to reinforce the hegemonic and subordinate identities 
of the perpetrator’s and victim’s group, are directed towards particular communities only, 
and that perpetrators and victims are strangers to one another. In so doing, it inadvertently 
marginalises a range of experiences that could, and should, be considered alongside the 
more familiar aspects of hate crime discourse. It is to these issues that the article now turns. 
 
Challenging conventional frameworks: hate crime victimisation 
A consistent theme throughout much of the literature on hate crime is the idea that 
expressions of hate are intrinsically linked to prevailing power dynamics that reinforce the 
dominance of the powerful and the marginalisation of the ‘other’. When viewed through 
such a lens, hate crimes prop up the perceived superiority of the perpetrators whilst 
simultaneously keeping victims in their ‘proper’ place by conveying a hate-fuelled message 
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to their wider community. While this stance accounts for many expressions of hate crime, it 
does not cover them all. Missing from this picture are those more spontaneous actions 
which result not from any entrenched prejudice on the part of the perpetrator but which 
occur in the context of a highly individualised ‘trigger’ situation (McGhee, 2007). Not all 
perpetrators of hate crime are prejudiced all or even most of the time, but instead may 
express prejudice as the outcome of a particular trigger incident or event in a departure 
from their standard norms of behaviour. The vast array of disputes and conflicts that could 
conceivably be motivated only in part by prejudice challenge the assumption that hate 
offences are invariably a mechanism of power designed to suppress the ‘other’.  
 
This assumption also seems to overlook the ‘ordinariness’ of much hate crime: ordinary not 
in relation to its impact upon the victim but in the sense of how it is conceived of by the 
perpetrator (see also Iganski, 2008). As Kidd and Witten (2008) observe in the context of 
transphobic violence, victims of hate crime may be targeted not just for their violation of 
accepted social norms but because they are stereotypically perceived as ‘easy’ or ‘soft’ 
targets. While hate crimes are undeniably linked to the underlying structural and cultural 
processes that leave minorities susceptible to systemic violence, conceiving of these 
offences exclusively as a mechanism of subordination overplays what for some perpetrators 
will be an act borne from more banal motivations. 
 
This point is key to drawing attention to those groups of victim whose experiences have 
been marginalised in conventional hate crime frameworks. Wachholz (2009), for instance, 
notes that there has been a long tradition of subjecting the homeless to acts of violence and 
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intimidation and yet this victimisation has been excluded from the social construction of 
hate crime. A review of recent cases in the UK suggests that similar points could be made in 
relation to targeted violence suffered by elderly and isolated victims (Meikle, 2011); by 
those with mental health issues or drug and alcohol dependency (Doward, 2010); by 
members of alternative subcultures such as goths or nu-metallers (Garland, 2010); by sex 
workers (Carter, 2010); or by foreign nationals, refugees, asylum seekers, migrant workers 
or overseas students (Athwal, Bourne and Wood, 2010; Fekete and Webber, 2010). These 
groups of victims could all conceivably be classified as ‘stigmatised and marginalised groups’ 
(to use Perry’s (2001) description), yet they are not. Lacking either the support of lobby 
groups or political representation, and typically seen as ‘undesirables’, criminogenic or less 
worthy than other more ‘legitimate’ or credible victim groups, they are commonly excluded 
from view.  
 
Hate crime frameworks can also fail to recognise the diversity within the broad labels that 
are used to denote categories of hate crime victim. In her study of hate crimes against Asian 
Americans, for example, Ahn Lin (2009) notes the rich diversity of ethnic groups associated 
with the term ‘Asian American’ – Asian Indians, Cambodians, Chinese, Filipinos, Hmong, 
Japanese, Koreans, Samoans, Thai and Vietnamese – whose experiences might deliberately 
or unwittingly be homogenised by scholars and policy makers. Similar points have been 
made in relation to the experiences of those who are grouped under the broad-brush 
categories of BME (black and minority ethnic), LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender) 
and disabled communities, where the dynamics and specificities of victimisation can be lost 
through the deployment of generic labels (Garland, Spalek and Chakraborti, 2006; Sherry, 
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2010). Generalising about diverse populations – or relying on empty notions of ‘community’ 
– instead of considering the discrete experiences of those who fall within the parameters of 
a particular group label tells us little about their particularities and the context behind their 
vulnerability. 
 
Furthermore, accounts of hate crime need to be more attuned to the intersectional nature 
of identity. For example, the harassment of lesbians may be caused by homophobia and by 
misogyny. A similar issue occurs in some instances against transgendered people where the 
higher level of victimisation incurred by male-to-female (MtF), as opposed to female-to-
male (FtM) transgender people has been explained by gender oppression (Whittle et al., 
2007). Equally, the intersections between a range of identity characteristics – including 
sexual orientation, ethnicity, disability, age, class, mental health, material deprivation or 
bodily shape and appearance (to name but some) – have been observed by a number of 
scholars, all of whom have exposed what Moran and Sharpe (2004: 400) describe as ‘the 
differences, the heterogeneity, within what are assumed to be homogeneous identity 
categories and groups’ (see also Dick, 2008; Meyer, 2010; Sherry, 2010). 
 
Recognising that hate crime can be the outcome of prejudice based upon multiple distinct 
yet connected lines is important for recognising the reality behind both the experience of 
victimisation and the commission of the offence. For instance, the accumulation of years of 
disablist harassment directed towards Fiona Pilkington and her family – which tragically led 
to her taking her own life and that of her daughter Francecca5 – has since been referred to 
as a watershed for the prioritisation of disablist victimisation.6 However, whilst the case acts 
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as a potent reminder of the nature and impact of prejudice directed towards disabled 
people, the relevance of related factors such as the family’s social isolation and their 
economically deprived locality should not be discounted. Hate crimes can often be 
exacerbated by socio-economic conditions, and some potential targets of hate crime may be 
better placed than others to avoid persecution by virtue of living at a greater distance from 
prejudiced neighbours or in less overtly hostile environments (Walters and Hoyle, 2012). 
 
Vulnerability to hate crime stems from a broader range of factors than singular conceptions 
of identity allow and this should be factored into contemporary conceptual frameworks, as 
should a further, often overlooked, dynamic of hate crime: namely, the capacity for 
members of minority groups to be perpetrators as well as victims of hate crime. **As 
Walters and Hoyle (ibid) suggest, it can become very difficult to distinguish between 
supposed perpetrators and victims during long-running and complex neighbourly disputes 
that feature hate incidents. Yet, within the study of hate crime, the contrasting roles of 
perpetrator and victim have often been taken as a ‘given’. This is reflected in Perry’s model 
which, by describing perpetrators and victims of hate offences in terms of their ‘superior’ 
and ‘subordinate’ identities, reinforces the sense that these are majority versus minority 
crimes; crimes which sustain the boundaries between dominant and subordinate groups 
and between perpetrator and victim. However, to conceive of hate crimes exclusively in this 
manner is to discount prejudice-fuelled violence and harassment perpetrated by minorities 
against fellow minorities, or indeed against those who might conventionally and 
simplistically be described as majority group members. Put simply, the kinds of biases, 
prejudices and stereotypes that form the basis of hate crimes are not the exclusive domain 
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of any particular group. The article now turns to acknowledge several similarly marginalised 
features of hate crime perpetration that can shape the development of a more nuanced 
conceptual framework. 
 
Challenging conventional frameworks: hate crime perpetration 
One of the more problematic issues surrounding hate crime relates to the fact that 
successful prosecution is contingent upon proof of the offender’s motive. However, contrary 
to popular stereotypes and the emotive imagery conjured up by the terminology, hate 
crimes are only very rarely committed by members of organised hate groups, supremacists 
or far-right extremists; the kinds of people whom one might immediately associate with 
being motivated by ‘hate’ for their victim and what they purportedly stand for. Rather, in 
much the same way that we referred to the ‘ordinariness’ of much hate crime offending in 
the passages above, most hate crimes tend to be committed by relatively ordinary people in 
the context of their everyday lives. For instance, Mason (2005: 844) has warned against the 
pursuit of ‘one size fits all’ explanations in this context, suggesting that hate crime 
perpetrators are often familiar to their victim either as an acquaintance, friend, family 
member, carer or partner. Equally, Iganski (2008) drawing on the work of Marcus Felson, 
reminds us that hate offenders are not so different from non-offenders in terms of their 
values and attitudes that they share. Studies conducted by Sibbitt (1997) and Ray, Smith and 
Wastell (2004) have come to similar conclusions regarding the parallels between racist 
offenders and perpetrators of non-hate crimes. For these scholars, hate offending is best 
understood as a feature of the ‘everyday’ prejudice that can be located in mainly deprived 
urban neighbourhoods7 where situational cues can give rise to the ‘animus expressed by 
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offenders, which lies beneath the surface of everyday cognition for many individuals’ 
(Iganski, 2008: 41).  
 
Of course, these explanations of offending behaviour do not necessarily contradict Perry’s 
thoughts about hate offences being mechanisms of oppression designed to reinforce the 
structural order. For Perry, such ideas can be applied even to perpetrators in positions 
which might be deprived or disadvantaged because it is the relative position of the powerful 
and subordinate groups within a social structure that confers ‘dominance, normativity and 
privilege’ on certain identities, and ‘subordination, marginality and disadvantage’ on others 
(Perry, 2001: 47). However, we would suggest that this line of thinking accounts for some, 
but not all forms of hate offending. Offences that we label as hate crimes may sometimes 
have little to do with any entrenched prejudice or hate on the part of the perpetrator but 
may instead arise as a departure from standard norms of behaviour; or through an inability 
to control language or behaviour in moments of stress, anger or inebriation; or from a sense 
of weakness or inadequacy that can stem from a range of subconscious emotional and 
psychological processes (Dixon and Gadd, 2006; Gadd, 2009; Walters, 2010). Equally, the 
selection of ‘soft’ or convenient targets because they are obviously ‘different’ (for instance, 
through markers of language, skin colour, dress or culture) or because they seem vulnerable 
(because of their age, isolation, disability or physical presence, to name but several factors) 
may have little to do with any conscious intent to suppress the ‘other’ or to communicate a 
message of hate to the victim’s wider community. Conceiving of these offences purely as a 
mechanism of oppression or subordination overplays what for some perpetrators will be an 
act borne from boredom, jealousy, convenience or unfamiliarity with ‘difference’. This 
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reality may not make the act any less reprehensible, but recognising it does affect our 
interpretation of hate crime. 
 
The relevance of perceived vulnerability and ‘difference’ 
The identity-based approach that has shaped conventional explanations of hate crime is 
constrained by the parameters set by official discourses, which often limit the reach of hate 
crime to prejudice directed towards the specific group identities. However, a vulnerability-
based approach acknowledges the heightened level of risk posed to certain groups or 
individuals that can arise through a complex interplay of different factors, including hate, 
prejudice, hostility, unfamiliarity, discomfort or simply opportunism or convenience. 
Vulnerability has rarely taken centre stage in hate crime discourse, although it is considered 
in some North American theorising, most notably in Woods’s (2009) work on unfair 
advantage theory which advocates that courts impose additional punishment in those cases 
where perpetrators exploit perceived disadvantages stemming from their victim’s group 
membership. Indeed, Woods (2009) advocates the use of the discriminatory selection model 
of hate crime, for which the notion of vulnerability is especially well suited. Under such a 
model, offenders target victims because of their particular characteristics which may or may 
not be inspired by hatred or hostility; or to use the words of the Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR, 2009: 48), where the offender ‘selected victims 
based on prejudices or stereotyped information about victim vulnerabilities’. As the ODIHR 
note, laws based on the discriminatory selection model can be easier to apply in practice 
and are more likely to better address the harms associated with hate crime than laws based 
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on a hostility model where proof of hostility or hatred towards the victim’s identity is 
required.  
 
Although the term ‘vulnerability’ is increasingly used by the mass media, politicians and 
scholars to characterise the significance of the fragile and contingent nature of 
contemporary society, its meaning is not always clear (Misztal, 2011). According to Cops and 
Pleysier (2011: 59), vulnerability refers to ‘the perception of exposure to danger, a loss of 
control over the situation and a perceived inadequate capacity to resist the direct and 
indirect consequences of victimisation’. Typically vulnerable groups or individuals include 
those who are impoverished, disenfranchised, or subject to discrimination, intolerance, 
subordination and stigma (Nyamathi, 1998). In the context of the preceding discussion this 
would include the elderly, the homeless, sex workers, refugees and asylum seekers, people 
with mental health issues or drug and alcohol dependency as well as other marginalised, 
invisible and tabooed populations targeted on the basis of their apparent vulnerability or 
obvious markers of ‘difference’. The victimisation suffered by these groups is likely to ‘hurt’ 
every bit as much as that suffered by established hate crime victim groups – and in some 
senses much more so.  
 
Green (2007) argues that vulnerability can have a political currency indicating the ‘value’ of 
the victim in the sense that the more vulnerable someone is, the greater the level of 
sympathy they elicit and the greater their need for security to minimise chances of 
victimisation (thereby cementing their transformation from victim to commodity). However, 
there are particular types of vulnerable victim who appear to have little or no political 
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currency whatsoever. Indeed as we write, the announcement of a package of ring-fenced 
UK government funding to protect society’s most vulnerable and persistently targeted 
victims makes no mention of the kinds of marginal, disenfranchised groups referred to 
above, but instead refers to victims of rape, sexual and domestic violence, robbery and 
burglary, anti-social behaviour and other worthy, yet familiar groups of victims (Ministry of 
Justice, 2011)8. This continued failure to account for the experiences of those who find 
themselves at the bottom of the hierarchy of victimisation and denied victim status 
(Walklate, 2011) underlines the relevance of vulnerability to criminology. 
 
Nonetheless, there is some resistance to the term ‘vulnerability’ in the field of hate studies. 
References to the disabled as vulnerable, for example, have been criticised for being 
inherently disablist in automatically conflating disability with vulnerability9 (Sherry, 2010; 
Quarmby, 2011) and for casting victims of disablist hate crime as requiring adult protection 
measures and a social care response rather than the fullest range of legal rights and 
protections provided through a criminal justice response (Perry, 2008). Roulstone, Thomas 
and Balderstone (2011) meanwhile, criticise the use of ‘vulnerable’ for its connotations of 
weakness and make reference to the inherently paternalistic process of powerful majority 
group members designating another as vulnerable as part of their service provision 
responsibilities.  
 
These concerns are certainly valid up to a point. However, we would argue that ‘vulnerable’ 
encapsulates the way in which many hate crime perpetrators view their target: as weak, 
defenceless, powerless or with a limited capacity to resist. A conceptual focus upon 
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perceived vulnerability should not be construed as suggesting that those in vulnerable 
positions suffer hate crime as an inevitability or as passive victims. As Walklate (2011) notes, 
we should not overlook victims’ capacity for resilience, and identifying factors that make 
people more or less resilient to hate crime victimisation should be a priority for researchers. 
Nor is it the case that all crimes against the vulnerable will invariably be hate crimes: legal 
frameworks tend to require evidence of bias motivation against the victim, whether this 
takes the form of hostility, prejudice, bigotry or hate, in conjunction with the crime itself 
(ODIHR, 2009).  
 
Moreover, it is not someone’s identity (their disability, their sexuality and so on) per se that 
makes them vulnerable in the context of hate crime. Rather, they may become a victim 
because of how that aspect of their identity intersects with other aspects of their self, and 
with other situational factors and context, to make them vulnerable in the eyes of the 
perpetrator. Green (2007), for instance, suggests that the higher rates of victimisation 
among black and minority ethnic communities should be understood not simply through 
reference to ethnicity but by recognising the relevance of socio-economic circumstance, age 
and the type of area they live in. A similar argument could be extended to other categories 
of hate crimes where the likelihood of being targeted is increased by the presence of factors 
that are separate from an individual’s ‘main’ or visible identity characteristic. Such a view 
underscores the relevance of our manner of dress, our command of English, our social class, 
our isolation, our routine activities, our physical presence – to name but some factors – to 
the process of victim selection. Whereas these factors are peripheral to an identity-centric 
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framework they assume a more prominent position within a framework which recognises 
vulnerability and ‘difference’. 
 
Understanding how ‘difference’ is central to many acts of hate crime is important if the 
notion of hate crime is to be reconfigured into a more inclusive concept. While being 
‘different’ does not automatically mean that someone is singled out for harassment or 
abuse, it can mean that those in vulnerable situations are at heightened risk of victimisation. 
For instance, a number of studies have shown that being ‘different’ in some conservative 
and traditional rural environments can be dangerous in communities intolerant of non-
conformity and outsiders (see, for instance, Neal, 2009; Cloke, 2004). Arguably, a fear of 
‘difference’ fuelled the harassment and bullying of Mary Fox and her son Raum in Bodmin in 
the West of England in 2009. Both were deemed to be ‘eccentric’ by local youths who 
subjected them to a sustained campaign of physical and verbal abuse that in the end 
resulted in Mary’s death (BBC, 2010).10 This case bore similarities to that of Fiona and 
Francecca Pilkington, discussed above, as it involved the bullying of those who were judged 
to be ‘different’ and whose learning difficulties made them appear an ‘easy target’. 
Elsewhere, Perry (2001) and Moran and Sharpe (2004) have argued that gay and 
transgendered people may be targeted because they too ‘stand out’ from accepted gender 
norms, while Hodkinson (2002) suggests that male Goths are harassed due to their 
‘effeminate’ appearance as well as their membership of an alternative subculture, leaving 
them especially vulnerable through this intersection of two aspects of their identity. In these 
instances, vulnerability is exacerbated through social conditions, prevailing norms and 
people’s reactions to ‘difference’.  
20 
 
 20 
 
Interpretations of vulnerability are diffuse, and incorporating factors that are vague or ill-
defined into our theoretical and policy frameworks could conceivably undermine the 
concept of hate crime. That said, vulnerability is no more ambiguous a term than any of the 
existing factors necessary for establishing whether or not a hate crime has occurred, 
whether this be hate, prejudice or hostility. Nor indeed is it any more ambiguous than some 
of the protected characteristics currently enshrined in different countries’ legislative hate 
crime frameworks, including social position or health status (Croatia11), political affiliation 
(Russia12), ideology (Spain13) or philosophy of life (Belgium14). Both the motivating factors 
and the protected grounds that form the basis of hate crime theory and policy in most 
countries are contingent upon contextual factors relevant to individual cases and are open 
to the interpretation of law enforcers. 
 
Similarly, another potential question mark against the widening of our conceptual 
understanding would be in relation to the practical implications this has for hate crime 
policy. Might the advantages of adopting a more inclusive interpretation of hate crime be 
offset by the operational challenges the expansion would pose to the development of policy 
guidance for legislators and criminal justice agencies? We would argue not. Many states use 
forms of bias motive as a factor which can result in a penalty enhancement for a criminal 
offence. Targeting someone because of their vulnerability could be one such factor that is 
incorporated into penal codes without overhauling existing hate crime laws. Equally, the 
dissemination of operational guidance on how to interpret hate crime which occurs at both 
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the state and transnational level could easily incorporate explicit direction on the relevance 
of perceived vulnerability. 
 
There are three further inter-related justifications for developing hate crime thinking around 
notions of perceived vulnerability and ‘difference’. First, and crucially, it directs attention 
towards those who fall between the cracks of existing scholarship and policy frameworks. At 
present we have little understanding of the victimisation directed towards less visible 
targets who may lack the power of class or language, the privilege of advocacy groups and 
support networks, or the bargaining clout of political, economic or social mobility. All too 
often these are people on the margins of society, or as Allan (2011) observes with reference 
to the homeless, ‘an inconvenient collection of individual tragedies … [people who] conjure 
an instant mental image, a quickening of the footsteps, an urge to rush past avoiding eye 
contact’. Acknowledging these kinds of ‘stigmatised and marginalised groups’ (to use Perry’s 
(2001) description) is precisely what hate crime scholarship and policy-making should be 
chiefly concerned with if it is to have meaning and legitimacy. 
 
Secondly, a vulnerability-centred approach to thinking about hate crime would be better 
attuned to recognising the intersectionality of identities that can be targeted by 
perpetrators of hate crime. Conceiving of hate crimes simply as offences directed towards 
individual strands of a person’s identity fails to give effect to the interplay of identities with 
one another and with other personal, social and situational characteristics. However, 
broadening our lines of enquiry to look at those targeted on the basis of their perceived 
vulnerability or ‘difference’ might allow us to move beyond singular constructions of 
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identity, and in particular to recognise the interplay between social class, socio-economic 
status and vulnerability. Many harrowing accounts of hate crime victimisation take place in 
areas on the economic margins – in areas that are avoided, ignored, written off – and yet 
the relevance of class and economic marginalisation to the commission of hate crime has 
rarely been a central feature of academic enquiry. 
 
Thirdly, giving greater focus to vulnerability feels all the more urgent in the current global 
financial climate where governments across the world are making drastic cuts to public and 
welfare services as part of ongoing austerity measures. These cuts are – and will continue to 
have – alarming social implications, as acknowledged by the United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) who have urged governments not to forget the risk 
posed by austerity measures to social protection, public health and education programmes 
(UNDESA, 2011), and by recent warnings from the Council for Europe Commissioner for 
Human Rights emphasising the potential impact of budget cuts on vulnerable groups (PILA, 
2011). A painful reality for most, if not all of the societies we live in is that grants are running 
out, contracts are winding down and the provision of services is shrinking at an alarming 
rate. Many of these are the kinds of unglamorous, sometimes discretionary or charitable 
services which rarely generate widespread publicity but whose closure has dire implications 
for the more disadvantaged and vulnerable members of any society.  
 
Conclusion 
Hate crime is a conceptually ambiguous and divisive subject area within criminology and this 
article has deliberately steered away from rehearsing now familiar ground in debating the 
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pros and cons of the hate crime label. Instead, and in light of the increased prioritisation of 
hate crime amongst criminologists and within criminal justice policy, this article has sought 
to re-align our conceptual focus in order to facilitate a more sophisticated model of 
theorising and policy formation. Within this context we noted the enduring influence of 
Barbara Perry’s (2001) theoretical framework, and observed that whilst there is little that is 
intrinsically contentious about this framework we have concerns about the way in which it 
has been interpreted to define the parameters of hate crime victimisation unduly narrowly. 
 
In particular, we have been critical of the way in which dominant interpretations of hate 
crime have reinforced the marginalisation of key issues. This includes our understanding of 
the more individualised acts of hate borne from boredom, jealousy or unfamiliarity with 
‘difference’; our awareness of those groups of victims whose experiences have been 
marginalised because they typically lack access to resources or political representation or 
because they are seen as less worthy than other more ‘legitimate’ victim groups; and our 
recognition of the intersectionality of identities that can be targeted by perpetrators of hate 
crime. These are all issues which should be central to our understanding of what a hate 
crime is, whom it affects and how we should respond. 
 
In order to address these oversights, we have proposed that perceived vulnerability and 
‘difference’ should be given a more prominent position within hate crime frameworks. Such 
a stance would encourage criminologists and policy-makers to move beyond the 
conventionally hierarchical identity-based approach that stringently, and singularly, 
associates hate crime with particular strands of victims and particular sets of motivations, 
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and instead to focus upon factors that unite victims of hate crime, which in essence is their 
perceived vulnerability and ‘difference’. It is not someone’s identity per se which makes 
them a vulnerable target in the eyes of the perpetrator, but rather the way in which that 
identity intersects with other aspects of their self and with other situational factors and 
context. As such, conceiving of hate crime through the lens of perceived vulnerability and 
‘difference’ gives effect to the realities of targeted victimisation, and in so doing allows us to 
transcend the homogenised generalisations all too prevalent within scholarly and policy 
domains.  
 
Reference list 
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) (2005) Hate Crime: Delivering A Quality Service - 
Good Practice and Tactical Guidance. London: Home Office Police Standards Unit.  
Ahn Lin, H. (2009) Race, bigotry and hate crime: Asian Americans and the construction of 
difference. In B. Perry (ed.) Hate Crimes Volume 3: The Victims of Hate Crime, Westport, 
CT: Praeger, 65-84. 
Allan, C. (2011) A much needed sanctuary from shocking homeless situations, the Guardian, 
5 April. 
Athwal, H., Bourne, J. and Wood, R. (2010) Racial Violence: The Buried Issue. London: The 
Institute of Race Relations. 
BBC (2010) Family victim “devoted mother”, BBC News at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/cornwall/8348325.stm, 7 November, accessed 15 
July 2011. 
25 
 
 25 
Bowling, B. (1993) Racial harassment and the process of victimisation, British Journal of 
Criminology 33(2): 231-250. 
Carter, H. (2010) ‘Crossbow cannibal’ victims’ drug habits made them vulnerable to 
violence, The Guardian, 21 December.  
Chakraborti, N (2010) Crimes against the ‘other’: conceptual, operational and empirical 
challenges for hate studies. Journal of Hate Studies 8(1): 9-28. 
Chakraborti, N. and Garland, J. (2009) Hate Crime: Impact, Causes and Responses. London: 
Sage. 
Chakraborti, N. and Garland, J. (eds) (2004) Rural Racism. Cullompton: Willan. 
Cloke, P. (2004) Rurality and racialised others: out of place in the countryside?, in N. 
Chakraborti and J. Garland, J. (eds) Rural Racism, Cullompton: Willan: 17-35. 
Cops, D. and Pleysier, S. (2011) ‘Doing gender’ in fear of crime. British Journal of Criminology 
51(1): 58-74. 
Crenshaw, K. (1991) Mapping the margins: intersectionality, identity politics and violence 
against women of color. Stanford Law Review 43(6): 1241-1299. 
Dick, S. (2008) Homophobic Hate Crime: The Gay British Crime Survey 2008. London: 
Stonewall. 
Dixon, B. and Gadd, D. (2006) Getting the message? ‘New’ Labour and the criminalisation of 
‘hate’. Criminology and Criminal Justice 6(3): 309-328. 
Doward, J. (2010) Vulnerable tenants targeted by drug gang ‘cuckoos’. The Observer, 3 
October, p. 16. 
26 
 
 26 
Fekete, L. and Webber, F. (2010) Foreign nationals, enemy penology and the criminal justice 
system. Race and Class 51(4): 1-25. 
Gadd, D. (2010) Racial aggravation or aggravating racism: overcoming the disjunction 
between legal and subjective realities. In N. Chakraborti (ed.) Hate Crimes: Concepts, 
Policy, Future Directions. Cullompton: Willan, 209-227. 
Gadd, D. (2009) Aggravating racism and elusive motivation. British Journal of Criminology 
49(6): 755-771. 
Garland, J. (2012) Dilemmas in defining hate crime victimisation. International Review of 
Victimology 18(1): 25-37. 
Garland, J. (2010) “It’s a mosher just been banged for no reason”: assessing the 
victimisation of goths and the boundaries of hate crime. International Review of 
Victimology 17(2): 159-177. 
Gerstenfeld, P. (2004) Hate Crimes: Causes, Controls and Controversies. London: Sage. 
Green, S. (2007) Crime, victimisation and vulnerability. In S. Walklate (ed.) Handbook of 
Victims and Victimology. Cullompton: Willan, 91-117. 
Hall, N. (2012) Policing hate crime in London and New York City. Some reflections on the 
factors influencing effective law enforcement, service provision and public trust and 
confidence. International Review of Victimology 18(1): 73-87. 
Hall, N. (2005) Hate Crime. Cullompton: Willan. 
Hodkinson, P. (2002) Goth: Identity, Style and Subculture. Oxford: Berg. 
Iganski, P. (2008) ‘Hate Crime’ and the City. Bristol: The Policy Press. 
Iganski, P. (2001) Hate crimes hurt more. American Behavioral Scientist 45: 697-713. 
27 
 
 27 
Jacobs, J. (2002) Hate crime: criminal law and identity politics. Theoretical Criminology 6(4): 
481-484. 
Jenness, V. and Grattet, R. (2001) Making Hate a Crime. From Social Movement to Law 
Enforcement. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Kelly, L. (1987) The continuum of sexual violence. In J. Hanmer and M. Maynard (eds) 
Women, Violence and Social Control. London: Macmillan, 46-60. 
Kidd, J. and Witten, T. (2008) Transgender and transsexual identities: the next strange fruit – 
hate crimes, violence and genocide against the global trans-communities. Journal of Hate 
Studies 6(1): 31-63. 
Lawrence, F. (1999) Punishing hate: bias crimes under American law. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
Mason, G. (2005) Hate crime and the image of the stranger. British Journal of Criminology, 
45(6): 837-859. 
McGhee, D. (2007) The challenge of working with racially motivated offenders: an exercise 
in ambivalence? Probation Journal 54(3): 213-226. 
Meikle, J. (2011) ‘Night stalker’ jailed for life. The Guardian, 25 March. 
Meyer, D. (2010) Evaluating the severity of hate-motivated violence: intersectional 
differences among LGBT hate crime victims. Sociology 44(5): 980-995. 
Ministry of Justice (2011) Nearly £30 million to help most vulnerable victims of crime. 
Ministry of Justice Press Release, 28 January. 
Misztal, B. (2011) The Challenges of Vulnerability: In Search of Strategies for a Less 
Vulnerable Social Life. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
28 
 
 28 
Moran, L. and Sharpe, A. (2004) Violence, identity and policing: the case of violence against 
transgender people. Criminal Justice 4(4): 395-417. 
Neal, S. (2009) Rural Identities: Ethnicity and Community in the Contemporary English 
Countryside. Farnham: Ashgate. 
Nyamathi, A. (1998) Vulnerable populations: a continuing nursing focus. Nursing Research 
47(2): 65-6. 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) (2009) Hate crime laws: a 
practical guide. Warsaw: ODIHR.  
Perry, B. (2009) The sociology of hate: theoretical approaches. In B. Perry (ed.) Hate Crime 
Volume One: Understanding and Defining Hate Crime. Westport, CT: Praeger, 55-76. 
Perry, B. (2001) In the Name of Hate: Understanding Hate Crimes. London: Routledge. 
Perry, J. (2008) The ‘perils’ of an identity politics approach to the legal recognition of harm. 
Liverpool Law Review 29(1): 19-36. 
Public Interest Law Alliance (PILA) 2011 Human Rights Commissioner warns Ireland budget 
cuts jeopardise human rights. Public Interest Law Alliance Bulletin 21 September 2011. 
Quarmby, K. (2011) Scapegoat: Why We Are Failing Disabled People. London: Portobello 
Books. 
Ray, L., Smith, D. and Wastell, L. (2004) Shame, rage and racist violence. British Journal of 
Criminology 44(3), 350-368. 
Roulstone, A., Thomas, P. and Balderstone, S. (2011) Between Hate and Vulnerability: 
Unpacking the British Criminal Justice System’s Construction of Disablist Hate Crime. 
Disability & Society 26(3): 351-364. 
29 
 
 29 
Sherry, M. (2010) Disability Hate Crimes: Does Anyone Really Hate Disabled People? 
Farnham: Ashgate. 
Sibbitt, R. (1997) The perpetrators of racial harassment and racial violence. Home Office 
Research Study 176. London, Home Office. 
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) (2011) The global 
social crisis: report on the world social situation 2011, at 
http://social.un.org/index/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=v0LQqd2FT3k%3d&tabid=1561, 
accessed 6 October 2011. 
Wachholz, S. Pathways through hate: exploring the victimisation of the homeless. In B. Perry 
(ed.) Hate Crimes Volume Three: The Victims of Hate Crime. Westport, CT: Praeger, 199-
222. 
Walby, S. (2007) Complexity theory, systems theory, and multiple intersecting social 
inequalities. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 37(4): 449-470. 
Walklate, S. (2011) Reframing criminal victimisation: finding a place for vulnerability and 
resistance. Theoretical Criminology 15(2): 179-194. 
Walters, M.A. and Hoyle, C. (2012) Exploring the everyday world of hate victimisation 
through community mediation. International Review of Victimology 18 (1): 7-24. 
Walters, M.A. (2010) A general theories of hate crime? Strain, doing difference and self 
control’. Critical Criminology 00: 1-18 (accessed 24 April 2011). 
Whittle, S., Turner, L. Al-Alami, M. (2007) Engendered Penalties: Transgender and 
Transsexual People's Experiences of Inequality and Discrimination. Wetherby: The 
Equalities Review.  
30 
 
 30 
Williams, R. (2009) Pilkington case may be a Lawrence moment for disability hate crime. The 
Guardian, 30 September, p.3.  
Woods, J.B. (2009) Taking the ‘hate’ out of hate crimes: applying unfair advantage theory to 
justify the enhanced punishment of opportunistic bias crimes. UCLA Law Review 56(2): 
489-541. 
 
 
                                                 
1  This may include characteristics such as the group affiliation of the victim; the imbalance of power between 
perpetrator and victim; the relevance of context, structure and agency to the process of hate crime; or the 
notion of acts of hate being ‘message’ crimes designed to create fear within the victim’s broader 
community (Chakraborti and Garland, 2009: 150). 
2  In the context of the United Kingdom for example, ACPO’s (2005) strategic hate crime guidance obliges the 
police to record all incidents where the motivation for hate or prejudice is based upon race, sexual 
orientation, faith, disability or transgender status. Across other countries, race, national origin and 
ethnicity are the characteristics most commonly protected through hate crime policy, closely followed by 
religion, whilst gender, age, disability and sexual orientation are also quite frequently protected 
characteristics (ODIHR, 2009). 
3  The SOPHIE (Stamp Out Prejudice, Hatred and Intolerance Everywhere) campaign, run by the Sophie 
Lancaster Foundation, aims to attain equal legal protection for members of alternative subcultures with 
those groups that are included in hate crime legislation. 
4  The Macpherson report – or the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry report as it sometimes referred to – is the 
report of a public inquiry, chaired by Sir William Macpherson, into the flawed police investigation into the 
racist murder of Stephen Lawrence in south-east London in 1993. Published in 1999 the report produced 
over 70 recommendations designed to transform the policing of ‘race’ and diversity within the UK, 
including Recommendation 12 which places the power to define racist incidents (and subsequently all hate 
incidents) in the hands of the individual victim rather than the police, thereby reducing the influence of 
discretion and occupational culture in the recording of a hate crime. 
5  Fiona, a 38 year old mother of Francecca, an 18 year old girl with learning difficulties, was driven to kill 
herself and her daughter in October 2007 by setting light to her car, with them both inside, near their 
home in Leicestershire, England, following years of disablist abuse from local youths directed at her family.  
6   Or ‘Macpherson moment’ for disablist hate crime (Williams, 2009). 
7  See also Chakraborti and Garland (2004) for an analysis of how everyday prejudice operates within a rural 
context.  
8  Other vulnerable victim groups referred to in the Ministry of Justice announcement include victims of 
serious violent crime; individuals bereaved by murder and manslaughter; and bereaved families of fatal 
road traffic crimes. Victims of hate crime are also included, and although no explanation is offered as to 
which groups this includes and how they would be supported through guaranteed funding, it presumably 
extends to those groups recognised within current Ministry of Justice and Association of Chief Police 
Officers guidance: namely, victims of racist, religiously motivated, homophobic, disablist and transphobic 
hate crime. 
9  Pain (2003: cited in Walklate, 2011) makes a similar point in relation to the stereotyping of the elderly as 
‘frail’ through presumptions of physical vulnerability. 
10  The harassment of Mary and Raum culminated in a firework being put through their letterbox on 5 
November 2009. Mary was killed in the resultant fire (BBC, 2010). 
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11  As noted in article 89, para. 36 of Croatia’s Criminal Code which criminalises hatred motivated by factors 
such as the victim’s social position or health status. 
12  As noted in article 63 of the Russian Criminal Code which includes hatred or animosity towards a political 
group as an aggravating factor.  
13  As noted by article 22.4 of Spain’s Criminal Code which includes discrimination motivated by the victim’s 
ideology as an aggravating factor. 
14  As noted in articles 33-42 of Belgium’s Law of 10 May 2007 which includes hatred against philosophy of 
life as one of the aggravating circumstances that can double the penalty of specified crimes. 
